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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine in detail a particularly in-
teresting pair of first-order theories. In addition to clarifying the overall
geography of notions of equivalence between theories, this simple exam-
ple yields two surprising conclusions about the relationships that theories
might bear to one another. In brief, we see that theories lack both the
Cantor-Bernstein and co-Cantor-Bernstein properties.
1 Introduction
Consider the following two theories.1
The theory T1. T1 is formulated in the signature Σ1 = {σ, p0, p1, p2, . . .}
where σ is a sort symbol and each of the pi is a unary predicate sym-
bol. We define the theory as follows:
T1 = {∃=1x(x = x)}
T1 says that there is exactly one thing, but it is silent on whether or not
that thing is pi.
The theory T2. T2 is formulated in the signature Σ2 = {σ, q0, q1, q2, . . .} where
σ is a sort symbol and each of the qi is a unary predicate symbol. We
define the theory as follows:
T2 = {∃=1x(x = x),∀x(q0(x)→ q1(x)),∀x(q0(x)→ q2(x)), . . .}
T2 says that there is exactly one thing, and that if that thing is q0, then
it is qi for all of the other i too. One can think of the predicate q0 as a
kind of ‘light switch’ that turns on all of the other predicates qi.
∗Draft of March 21, 2019. The authors can be reached at tbarrett@philosophy.ucsb.edu
and hhalvors@princeton.edu. Thanks to Laurenz Hudetz for discussion on these issues.
1For preliminaries on model theory the reader is encouraged to consult Hodges (2008). For
additional discussion of these two theories see Halvorson (2012) and Barrett and Halvorson
(2016b).
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The aim of this paper is to examine these theories and the relationships
between them. In particular, we will demonstrate the following five claims.
1. T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent.
2. T1 and T2 are not Morita equivalent.
3. There are conservative translations F : T1 → T2 and G : T2 → T1.
4. There are essentially surjective translations H : T1 → T2 and K : T2 → T1.
5. There is no essentially surjective and conservative translation between T1
and T2 (in either direction).
It is natural to separate these claims into two kinds. The first two claims are
about what kinds of extensions exist for T1 and T2 (i.e. they have no common
definitional nor Morita extension), while the last three are about what kinds of
translations exist between T1 and T2.
After proving these claims, we will draw some conclusions from this example
that are related to current debates concerning the structure and equivalence of
theories. In addition to clarifying the overall geography of notions of equivalence
between theories, this simple example yields two surprising conclusions about
theories. First, it can be that one theory is embeddable in another and the
other is embeddable in the one, but the two theories are not equivalent. And
second, it can be that one theory ‘has all of the structure’ of another and the
other ‘has all of the structure’ of the one, but the two theories are nonetheless
do not have the same structure. In brief, one might put these two conclusions as
follows: Theories lack both the Cantor-Bernstein and the co-Cantor-Bernstein
properties.
2 Extension
Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures with p ∈ Σ+ − Σ an n-ary predicate symbol. Recall
that a definitional extension of a Σ-theory T to the signature Σ+ is a Σ+-
theory
T+ = T ∪ {δs : s ∈ Σ+ − Σ},
such that for each predicate symbol s ∈ Σ+ − Σ, the sentence δs is an explicit
definition of s in terms of Σ. One can also define new function and constant
symbols, but for our purposes this will not be important.
Recall that two theories are definitionally equivalent if they have a ‘com-
mon definitional extension’. More precisely: if T1 is a Σ1-theory and T2 is a
Σ2-theory, T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if there is a definitional ex-
tension T+1 of T1 to the signature Σ1 ∪Σ2 and a definitional extension T+2 of T2
to the signature Σ1 ∪ Σ2 such that T+1 and T+2 are logically equivalent (in the
sense that they have the same class of models).
We now have the following simple proposition.
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Proposition 1. T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that T is a common definitional extension of
T1 and T2. Since T defines each of the predicate symbols of T2, there is a Σ1-
sentence φ such that T  ∀yq0(y)↔ φ. Now one can verify that the sentence φ
has the following property: If ψ is a Σ1-sentence and T1  ψ → φ, then either
(i) T1  ¬ψ or (ii) T1  φ→ ψ. But φ cannot have this property. Consider the
Σ1-sentence
φ ∧ ∀xpi(x)
where pi is a predicate symbol that does not occur in φ. We trivially see that
T1  (φ ∧ ∀xpi(x)) → φ, but neither (i) nor (ii) hold of φ ∧ ∀xpi(x). This is a
contradiction, so T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent.
It has recently been suggested that definitional equivalence is too strict a
standard of equivalence between theories, in the sense that it judges theories
to be inequivalent that we have good reason to consider equivalent. For exam-
ple, Euclidean geometry can be formulated with only a sort of points (Tarski,
1959), with only a sort of lines (Schwabha¨user and Szczerba, 1975), or with
both a sort of points and a sort of lines (Hilbert, 1930).2 Since these formula-
tions use different sort symbols, and we have so far provided no way of defining
new sort symbols, definitional equivalence does not capture any sense in which
they are equivalent. In order to address this shortcoming of definitional equiv-
alence, a more liberal standard of equivalence has been proposed. It has been
called “Morita equivalence” (by Barrett and Halvorson (2016b, 2017a,b)) and
“generalized definitional equivalence” (by Andre´ka et al. (2008)).3
The precise details of Morita equivalence are not important for our purposes
here, but the basic idea is simple. Morita equivalence allows one to define new
sort symbols — in addition to new predicate, function, and constant symbols
— using some basic construction rules. Two theories are then said to be Morita
equivalent if they have a ‘common Morita extension’, which is just like a common
definitional extension except that it might define new sorts. One can show
that geometry formulated in terms of points is Morita equivalent to geometry
formulated in terms of lines; one uses the sort of lines to build the sort of points,
and vice versa (Barrett and Halvorson, 2017a).
One might wonder whether our theories T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent.
The following simple result has already been demonstrated.4
Proposition 2. T1 and T2 are not Morita equivalent.
Proof. The proof proceeds in precisely the same manner as the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. Barrett and Halvorson (2016b, Theorem 5.2) give the precise details.
2See Szczerba (1977) and Schwabha¨user et al. (1983, Proposition 4.59, Proposition 4.89).
3See also Hudetz (2017a,b) and Tsementzis (2015).
4The result goes through even if one formulates T1 and T2 using two different sort symbols,
instead of the same sort symbol σ.
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3 Translation
Our next three claims are about the kinds of ‘translations’ that exist between
these theories. We need some basic preliminaries.
Let Σ1 and Σ2 be signatures. A reconstrual F of Σ1 into Σ2 is a map from
the predicates in the signature Σ1 to Σ2-formulas that takes an n-ary predicate
symbol p ∈ Σ1 to a Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn) with n free variables.5 One can
think of the Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn) as the ‘translation’ of the Σ1-formula
p(x1, . . . , xn) into the signature Σ2. We will use the notation F : Σ1 → Σ2 to
denote a reconstrual F of Σ1 into Σ2.
A reconstrual F : Σ1 → Σ2 extends to a map from arbitrary Σ1-formulas
to Σ2-formulas in the natural recursive manner. In the case where one is only
considering signatures with predicate symbols (as we are here), this map is
particularly easy to describe. Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) be a Σ1-formula. We define the
Σ2-formula Fφ(x1, . . . , xn) recursively as follows.
• If φ(x1, . . . , xn) is xi = xj , then Fφ(x1, . . . , xn) is the Σ2-formula xi = xj .
• If φ(x1, . . . , xn) is p(x1, . . . , xn), where p ∈ Σ1 is an n-ary predicate sym-
bol, then Fφ(x1, . . . , xn) is the Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn).
• If Fφ and Fψ have already been defined for Σ1-formulas φ and ψ, then
we define the Σ2-formula F (¬φ) to be ¬Fφ, F (φ ∧ ψ) to be Fφ ∧ Fψ,
F (∀xφ) to be ∀xFφ, etc.
Suppose that T1 and T2 are theories in the signatures Σ1 and Σ2, respectively.
We say that a reconstrual F : Σ1 → Σ2 is a translation F : T1 → T2 if T1  φ
implies that T2  Fφ for every Σ1-sentence φ. A translation F gives rise to a
map F ∗ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1), which takes models of the theory T2 to models
of the theory T1. For every model A of T2 we first define a Σ1-structure F
∗(A)
as follows.
• dom(F ∗(A)) = dom(A).
• (a1, . . . , an) ∈ pF∗(A) if and only if A  Fp[a1, . . . , an].
A straightforward argument demonstrates that F ∗(A) is indeed a model of T1
(Barrett and Halvorson, 2016a, §4).
A translation F : T1 → T2 is conservative if T2  Fφ implies that T1  φ
for any Σ1-sentence φ. We make two brief remarks about this concept. First,
one can think of a conservative translation as a kind of ‘injection’ or ‘embedding’
on sentences. Indeed, one can easily verify that the following simple condition
is equivalent to a translation F : T1 → T2 being conservative.
• For any Σ1-sentences φ1 and φ2, if T2  Fφ1 ↔ Fφ2 then T1  φ1 ↔ φ2.
5This notion naturally extends to signatures that contain function and constant symbols,
but that will be unimportant for our purposes. See Hodges (2008), Button and Walsh (2018),
and Barrett and Halvorson (2016a) for details.
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This condition is clearly capturing a kind of injectivity on sentences: If a trans-
lation maps two Σ1-sentences to equivalent Σ2-sentences, then they must have
been equivalent to begin with. Second, one can easily verify that if a transla-
tion F : T1 → T2 is such that F ∗ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1) is surjective, then F is
conservative.
We now have our first simple result concerning the existence of translations
between our theories T1 and T2.
Proposition 3. There are conservative translations F : T1 → T2 and G : T2 →
T1.
Proof. Consider the reconstruals F : Σ1 → Σ2 and G : Σ2 → Σ1 defined by
F : pi 7−→ qi+1 G : qi 7−→ p0 ∨ pi
It is trivial that F : T1 → T2 is a translation. Since G maps the Σ2-sentence
∀x(q0(x) → qi(x)) to ∀x((p0(x) ∨ p0(x)) → (p0(x) ∨ pi(x))) and T1 entails this
latter sentence, it follows that G is a translation too.
It remains to show that F and G are conservative. One does this by showing
that F ∗ and G∗ are surjective. Suppose that M is a model of T1. Then M is
completely determined by which of the pi hold of the one thing. We let N be
the model of T2 defined as follows: N has the same domain as M , q0 does not
hold of the one thing in N , and qi+1 holds of the one thing in N if and only if
pi holds of the only thing in M . One trivially sees that F
∗(N) = M , so F ∗ is
surjective. A similar argument shows that G∗ is surjective.
Since they are conservative, the translations F and G from Proposition 3
can be thought of as injections or embeddings between the theories T1 and T2.
But there is a natural sense in which neither is ‘surjective’. For example, F
does not map any Σ1-formula to any logical equivalent of the Σ2-formula q0(x).
The following property makes this thought precise. We say that a translation
F : T1 → T2 is essentially surjective if for every Σ2-formula ψ there is a Σ1-
formula φ such that T2  ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ Fφ(x1, . . . , xn)). One can
easily verify that neither F nor G from Proposition 3 are essentially surjective.
But we do have the following simple result.
Proposition 4. There are essentially surjective translations H : T1 → T2 and
K : T2 → T1.
Proof. Consider the reconstruals H : Σ1 → Σ2 and K : Σ2 → Σ1 defined by
H : pi 7−→ qi K(qi) =
{
p0 ∧ ¬p0 if i = 0
pi−1 otherwise
It is trivial that H is an essentially surjective translation. Since K maps the
Σ2-sentence ∀x(q0(x)→ qi(x)) to ∀x((p0(x)∧¬p0(x))→ pi−1(x)) and T1 entails
this latter sentence, it follows that K is a translation. It is easy to see that K
is essentially surjective.
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One can verify that the theory T1 does not entail the sentence ∀x(p0(x) →
p1(x)), but T2 does entail H(∀x(p0(x)→ p1(x))). Similarly, the theory T2 does
not entail ¬∀xq0(x), but T1 does entail K(¬∀xq0(x)). This means that neither
H nor K is conservative.
One therefore wonders whether there is any translation between T1 and T2
that is essentially surjective and conservative. One might consider a transla-
tion like this to be an ‘isomorphism’ between the two theories. The following
proposition settles this issue.
Proposition 5. There is no essentially surjective and conservative translation
between T1 and T2 (in either direction).
Proof. Suppose that there is a translation F : T1 → T2 that is essentially
surjective and conservative. We show that this implies that T1 and T2 are
definitionally equivalent, which contradicts Proposition 1. (The same argument
demonstrates that there is no essentially surjective and conservative translation
T2 → T1.)
Let qi be one of the predicate symbols in Σ2. Since F is essentially surjective,
there is some Σ1-formula φi such that T2  ∀x(qi(x) ↔ φi(x)). This allows us
to define a reconstrual G : Σ2 → Σ1 by setting G(qi) = φi. One then uses the
fact that F is conservative to verify that G : T2 → T1 is a translation, and to
verify that both T1  φ ↔ GFφ and T2  ψ ↔ FGψ for all Σ1-formulas φ
and Σ2-formulas ψ. This means that T1 and T2 are intertranslatable, and so
(Barrett and Halvorson, 2016a, Theorem 2) implies that they are definitionally
equivalent.
4 Conclusion
We conclude by mentioning three payoffs of this discussion.
Mutual faithful interpretability and Morita equivalence
The first concerns the recent debate about when two theories should be consid-
ered equivalent. A significant amount of attention has been devoted to better
understanding the relationships between different standards of equivalence of
theories and to applying these standards to various cases of interest.6 The sim-
ple example that we have considered here allows us to further clarify the overall
geography of standards of equivalence between theories.
6For discussion of these relationships, see for example Barrett and Halvorson (2016a,b) and
(Button and Walsh, 2018, p. 118). In addition to the recent articles on equivalence already
cited, see Barrett (2017), Coffey (2014), Curiel (2014), Halvorson (2013), Glymour (2013),
Hudetz (2015, 2017a), Knox (2011, 2014), North (2009), Rosenstock et al. (2015), Rosenstock
and Weatherall (2016), Teh and Tsementzis (2017), Van Fraassen (2014), and Weatherall
(2016, 2017), and the references therein
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Recall that T1 and T2 are mutually faithfully interpretable if there are
conservative translations F : T1 → T2 and G : T2 → T1.7 It is already well-
known that definitional equivalence is a stricter standard of equivalence than
mutual faithful interpretability is. More precisely, any pair of theories that
are definitionally equivalent are mutually faithfully interpretable, but there are
mutually faithful interpretable theories that are not definitionally equivalent
(Andre´ka et al., 2005; Button and Walsh, 2018). Morita equivalence, however,
is a more liberal notion of equivalence than definitional equivalence. So it is
natural to ask the following question.
If two theories T1 and T2 are mutually faithfully interpretable, then
are T1 and T2 also Morita equivalent?
If the answer to this question were yes — that is, if mutual faithful inter-
pretability entailed Morita equivalence — this would be a mark against Morita
equivalence as a plausible standard of equivalence between theories. It is widely
accepted that mutual faithful interpretability is too liberal a standard of equiva-
lence; it considers theories to be equivalent that we have good reason to consider
inequivalent (Szczerba, 1977). So if the answer to the above question were yes,
this would immediately imply that Morita equivalence is too liberal a standard
as well.
The answer to the above question, however, is no. It is not the case that
Morita equivalence is entailed by mutual faithful interpretability. Our discussion
here has demonstrated precisely this. It follows from Proposition 3 that our
theories T1 and T2 are mutually faithfully interpretable, but as was stated in
Proposition 2, they are not Morita equivalent.
The second and third payoffs of this discussion are of a more straightfor-
wardly philosophical nature. This example yields the following two surprising
conclusions about theories. It can be that one theory is embeddable in another
and the other is embeddable in the one, but the two theories are not equivalent.
And it can be that one theory ‘has all of the structure’ of another and the other
‘has all of the structure’ of the one, but the two theories do not have the same
structure.
The Cantor-Bernstein property
We begin by discussing the former. Proposition 3 captures a sense in which T1
can be embedded in T2 and T2 can be embedded in T1. The existence of the
conservative translation F : T1 → T2 shows us that T1 can be ‘viewed as a part
of’ T2. It is easy to see how this is the case: T1 can be viewed as the part of
T2 that is constructed from the predicate symbols q1, q2, . . . and so on. And
similarly the existence of the conservative translation G : T2 → T1 shows us
that one can view T2 as a part of T1; it can be viewed as the part of T1 that is
constructed from the Σ1-formulas p0, p0 ∨ p1, p0 ∨ p2, . . . and so on. Despite the
7See Button and Walsh (2018, p. 117). Our presentation here is slightly less general, since
we have not discussed translations with parameters.
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fact that each of these theories can be embedded in the other, they are not the
same theory. Propositions 1, 2, and 5 substantiate this intuition. Our theories
T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent, Morita equivalent, nor does there
exist an essentially surjective and conservative translation between them.
What we have essentially shown is that theories lack the Cantor-Bernstein
property. The Cantor-Bernstein theorem famously says that if there are in-
jections f : X → Y and g : Y → X between sets X and Y , then there is a
bijection between X and Y . Because of this theorem we say that sets have
the Cantor-Bernstein property. And indeed, it makes sense to talk about the
Cantor-Bernstein property for any category. One says that a category C has
the Cantor-Bernstein property if for any objects c and d of C whenever there
is a monomorphism (i.e. a generalization of the concept of an injection) from
c → d and a monomorphism d → c, the objects c and d are isomorphic. The
property captures a basic intuition one might have about the notion of ‘being a
part of’: If X is a part of Y and Y is a part of X, then X and Y are the same.
Our example here demonstrates that the category of theories does not have
the Cantor-Bernstein property.8 In other words, the analogue of the Cantor-
Bernstein theorem does not hold of theories: T1 and T2 can be embedded into
one another, but nonetheless they are not the same.9
The co-Cantor Bernstein property
We now turn to our final payoff. It can be that one theory ‘has all of the
structure’ of another and the other ‘has all of the structure’ of the one, but the
two theories do not have the same structure. One might put this payoff more
suggestively as follows: It can be that one theory ‘is as ideologically rich as’
another and the other ‘is as ideologically rich as’ the one, but the two theories
are not ideologically equivalent. The ideology of a theory is usually thought of as
the range of concepts that are expressible in the language in which the theory
is formulated (Quine, 1951). It takes a moment to explain why our example
yields this surprising conclusion about structure and ideology.
The existence of an essentially surjective translation H : T1 → T2 captures a
sense in which T1 has all the structure of (or is as ideologically rich as) T2. The
idea here is simple, when H is essentially surjective, any formula ψ that one can
formulate in the language of T2 is expressible using the language of T1; that is
precisely what the essential surjectivity of H guarantees. There is some formula
φ in the language of T1 that H translates to a logical equivalent of ψ. Intuitively,
this means that the theory T1 can define all of the structures that T2 has. Or in
other words, T1 can express all of the same concepts that T2 can. Quine (1951,
p. 15) himself endorses the basic idea that one can investigate the ideology of a
8There are various ways to ‘categorify’ the collection of first-order theories. The reader is
encouraged to consult Visser (2006) for details.
9Another example of the failure of the Cantor-Bernstein property is the relation between
classical and intuitionistic logic. Obviously, intuitionistic logic can be embedded in classical
logic. The famous Go¨del translation shows that intuitionistic logic can be embedded in clas-
sical logic. But it is nonetheless unnatural to think of the two logics as equivalent, as was
recently pointed out, for example, by Dewar (2018).
8
theory by examining what kinds of translations exist between theories: “Much
that belongs to ideology can be handled in terms merely of the translatability
of notations from one language into another; witness the mathematical work on
definability by Tarski and others.”
One can grasp the basic idea here by considering the following two simple
examples. Suppose that T is a theory in the signature Σ and consider the
signature Σ+ = Σ ∪ {p}, where p is a new unary predicate symbol
1. Suppose that T+ is the Σ+-theory that has precisely the same axioms as
T . There is a natural sense in which T+ has all of the structure of T , but
not vice versa; T+ has the new piece of structure p that T lacks. One
can capture this basic idea by looking to facts about essentially surjective
translations between these two theories.
First, there is an essentially surjective translation T+ → T . The transla-
tion simply maps each symbol in Σ to itself and maps p to any Σ-formula
with one free variable. It is trivial to verify that this is indeed an essen-
tially surjective translation. This makes precise our basic intuition that
T+ is as ideologically rich as T . Second, since there is no Σ-formula that is
logically equivalent to p, the translation T → T+ that maps every element
of Σ to itself is not essentially surjective. This makes precise our intuition
that T is not as ideologically rich as T+.
2. Now suppose instead that T+ is a definitional extension of T to the sig-
nature Σ+. In this case there is a strong sense in which T and T+ have
precisely the same structure and ideologically richness; p is not a piece
of structure that is new to T+. Rather, it is explicitly definable in terms
of those structures that T posits, so there is a strong sense in which T
already has the structure p.
This basic intuition can be made precise by noticing that there are essen-
tially surjective translations T → T+ and T+ → T . It follows from our
discussion in point 1 above that there is an essentially surjective transla-
tion T+ → T . And since T+ is a definitional extension of T , the translation
T → T+ that maps every element in Σ to itself is in this case essentially
surjective. The Σ-formula φ that defines p is (obviously) logically equiva-
lent to p.
The existence of an essentially surjective translation from T1 to T2 captures
a strong sense in which T1 has all of the structure or ideological richness of T2.
The two examples above show that this idea is a direct generalization of the
kinds of simple examples that formed our intuitions about amounts of structure
and ideological richness in the first place.
In addition, the tools that have recently been used to compare amounts of
structure between theories cohere well with the idea that essentially surjective
translations capture facts about structure. It has been suggested — by Earman
(1989), and more recently by North (2009), Swanson and Halvorson (2012), and
Barrett (2015a,b) — that the size of an object’s automorphism group can be used
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as a guide to the amount of structure that the object has. An automorphism
of an object is a structure-preserving bijection from the object to itself. If an
object has more automorphisms, therefore, that suggests that the object has less
structure that these automorphisms are required to preserve. The important
fact for our purposes here is the following: If there is an essentially surjective
translation from T1 to T2, this captures a sense in which the models of these
two theories have automorphism groups of precisely the same size.
It only takes a moment to make this claim precise. An automorphism of
a Σ-structure M is a bijection f : M → M that satisfies M  p[a1, . . . , an] if
and only if M  p[f(a1), . . . f(an)] for any predicate symbol p ∈ Σ and elements
a1, . . . , an ∈M . One can easily prove the following.10
Proposition 6. Let H : T1 → T2 be an essentially surjective translation with
N a model of T2. Then H
∗(N) and N have the same automorphism group.
Proof. If f : N → N is an automorphism of N , one can easily verify using
the definition of H∗ that f is also an automorphism of H∗(N). Suppose that
f : H∗(N)→ H∗(N) is an automorphism and let q ∈ Σ2 be a predicate symbol
in the signature of T2. We immediately see that for any a ∈ N :
N  q[a]⇐⇒ H∗(N)  φ[a]⇐⇒ H∗(N)  φ[f(a)]⇐⇒ N  q[f(a)]
Here φ is a Σ1-formula such that Hφ is logically equivalent to q, whose existence
is guaranteed by the essential surjectivity of H. The first and third bicondition-
als follow from this choice of φ and the definition of H∗, while the second follows
from the fact that f is an automorphism of H∗(N). This means that f is an
automorphism of N .
Our current best methods of comparing amounts of structure therefore lend
further support to the following claim: The existence of an essentially surjective
translation from T1 to T2 captures a sense in which T1 has all of the structure
or ideological richness of T2.
Now that we have this idea on the table, we can return to consider our pair
of theories T1 and T2. As we have seen in Proposition 4, there are essentially
surjective translations H : T1 → T2 and K : T2 → T1. This captures a sense
in which T1 has all of the structure of (or is as ideologically rich as) T2 and T2
has all of the structure of (or is as ideologically rich as) T1. But Propositions
1, 2, and 5 imply that T1 and T2 do not have the same structure or the same
ideology. This is completely intuitive: T2 has a kind of ‘light switch’ predicate
q0 that turns on all of the other predicates qi, while T1 contains no such piece
of structure.
This shows that theories lack what one might call the ‘co-Cantor-Bernstein
property’. It is easy to verify that if there are surjections f : X → Y and
g : Y → X between sets X and Y , then there is a bijection between X and
10A similar argument actually demonstrates an even stronger result: If F is essentially
surjective translation, then F ∗ is a full functor between the categories of models of T2 and T1
(Halvorson, 2019; Barrett, 2018).
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Y . One might call this the ‘co-Cantor-Bernstein theorem’, and therefore say
that sets have the co-Cantor-Bernstein property. Once again, it makes sense
to talk about the co-Cantor-Bernstein property for any category. We can say
that a category C has the co-Cantor-Bernstein property if for any objects c and
d of C whenever there is an epimorphism (i.e. a generalization of the concept
of an surjection) from c → d and an epimorphism d → c, the objects c and d
are isomorphic. Our example here demonstrates that the category of theories
does not have this proeprty. Our two theories T1 and T2 can be surjected onto
one another, but nonetheless, as Propositions 1, 2, and 5 tell us, they are not
equivalent. These concepts of amount of structure and ideological richness are
therefore more subtle than one might have initially thought.
One might wonder how these results come to bear on the current debates
about structure and equivalence in philosophy of science. Real scientific the-
ories are, of course, much more complicated than theories in first-order logic.
We therefore should be careful not to assume that the ‘category of all scien-
tific theories’ has all the features that the category of first-order theories has.
Nonetheless, we should take ‘no go’ results like the ones we have presented here
very seriously. If the category of first-order theories fails to have some nice,
simple feature — like the Cantor-Bernstein or co-Cantor-Bernstein properties
— then that gives us reason to doubt that the category of all scientific theories
will have that feature. For example, it would seem natural to think that if T1 is
reducible to T2, and T2 is reducible to T1, then T1 and T2 are equivalent theories.
This is exactly the kind of inference, however, that the results presented here
about first-order theories call into question.
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